350 BC
 
 POLITICS
 
 by Aristotle

 Translated by Benjamin Jowett
 
 
 
 BOOK ONE
 
 
 
 I

  EVERY STATE is a community of some kind, and every community is
established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in
order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities
aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the
highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a
greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.

  Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king,
householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in
kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler
over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a
household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if
there were no difference between a great household and a small
state. The distinction which is made between the king and the
statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is
a king; when, according to the rules of the political science, the
citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.

  But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will
be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method
which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so
in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple
elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the
elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in
what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and
whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.

                                    II

  He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin,
whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of
them. In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot
exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race
may continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate
purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants,
mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of
themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be
preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by
nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its
body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a
slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now nature has
distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not
niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many
uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is
best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among
barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because
there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of
slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say,

     It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;

as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature
one.

  Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and
slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right
when he says,

     First house and wife and an ox for the plough,

for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association
established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, and
the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the
cupboard,' and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.'
But when several families are united, and the association aims at
something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be
formed is the village. And the most natural form of the village
appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the
children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the
same milk.' And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally
governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before
they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled
by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the
kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same
blood. As Homer says:

     Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times.
Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves
either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they
imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to
be like their own.

  When several villages are united in a single complete community,
large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes
into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and
continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if
the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is
the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each
thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are
speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause
and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end
and the best.

  Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that
man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by
mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above
humanity; he is like the

     Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,

whom Homer denounces- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war;
he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.

  Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other
gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes
nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed
with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication
of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for
their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the
intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of
speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and
therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic
of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and
unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have
this sense makes a family and a state.

  Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to
the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for
example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or
hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand;
for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things
are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that
they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but
only that they have the same name. The proof that the state is a
creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual,
when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a
part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in
society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must
be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social
instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first
founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when
perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and
justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more
dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used
by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends.
Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most
savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice
is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which
is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in
political society.

                                   III

  Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking
of the state we must speak of the management of the household. The
parts of household management correspond to the persons who compose
the household, and a complete household consists of slaves and
freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in its fewest
possible elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a family
are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have
therefore to consider what each of these three relations is and
ought to be: I mean the relation of master and servant, the marriage
relation (the conjunction of man and wife has no name of its own), and
thirdly, the procreative relation (this also has no proper name).
And there is another element of a household, the so-called art of
getting wealth, which, according to some, is identical with
household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the
nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.

  Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of
practical life and also seeking to attain some better theory of
their relation than exists at present. For some are of opinion that
the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a
household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal
rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same. Others affirm
that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and
that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and
not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore
unjust.

                                    IV

  Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring
property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man
can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with
necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the
workers must have their own proper instruments for the
accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a
household. Now instruments are of various sorts; some are living,
others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in
the look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant
is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument
for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a
slave is a living possession, and property a number of such
instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument which takes
precedence of all other instruments. For if every instrument could
accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others,
like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which,
says the poet,

     of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods;

if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the
lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want
servants, nor masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction
must be drawn; the instruments commonly so called are instruments of
production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The
shuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something else is made
by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use.
Further, as production and action are different in kind, and both
require instruments, the instruments which they employ must likewise
differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore
the slave is the minister of action. Again, a possession is spoken
of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of
something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a
possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not
belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his
master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and
office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another's
man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another's man who,
being a human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be
defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.

                                    V

  But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and
for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all
slavery a violation of nature?

  There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both
of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled
is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their
birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

  And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that
rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects- for
example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for
the work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where
one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a
work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which are
made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction
between the ruling and the subject element comes to fight. Such a
duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it
originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which
have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we
are wandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict ourselves
to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul
and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the
other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of
nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which
are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the
most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see
the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the
body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an
evil and unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly observe
in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for
the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the
intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule.
And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the
mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and
expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior
is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to
men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame
animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are
preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female
inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle,
of necessity, extends to all mankind.

  Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body,
or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business
is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort
are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors
that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and
therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational
principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a
slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a
principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of
slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with
their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to
distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one
strong for servile labor, the other upright, and although useless
for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war
and peace. But the opposite often happens- that some have the souls
and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed
from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the
statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the
inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true
of the body, how much more just that a similar distinction should
exist in the soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the
beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are
by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery
is both expedient and right.

                                    VI

  But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way
right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and
slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as
well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention-
the law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the
victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an
orator who brought forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest
the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence and
is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject.
Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin
of the dispute, and what makes the views invade each other's
territory, is as follows: in some sense virtue, when furnished with
means, has actually the greatest power of exercising force; and as
superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of
some kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply
one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice with
goodwill while the other identifies it with the mere rule of the
stronger). If these views are thus set out separately, the other views
have no force or plausibility against the view that the superior in
virtue ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think,
simply to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of
justice), assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of war
is justified by law, but at the same moment they deny this. For what
if the cause of the war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say he
is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of
the highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or
their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore
Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term
to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean the
natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted
that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle
applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere,
and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbarians
noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts
of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The
Helen of Theodectes says:

     Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides
sprung from the stem of the Gods?

What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery,
noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They
think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good
men a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend
it, cannot always accomplish.

  We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of
opinion, and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by
nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction
between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the
one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing
obedience, the others exercising the authority and lordship which
nature intended them to have. The abuse of this authority is injurious
to both; for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are
the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but
separated part of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of
master and slave between them is natural they are friends and have a
common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force the
reverse is true.

                                   VII

  The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a
master is not a constitutional rule, and that all the different
kinds of rule are not, as some affirm, the same with each other. For
there is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free,
another over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of a
household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas
constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals. The
master is not called a master because he has science, but because he
is of a certain character, and the same remark applies to the slave
and the freeman. Still there may be a science for the master and
science for the slave. The science of the slave would be such as the
man of Syracuse taught, who made money by instructing slaves in
their ordinary duties. And such a knowledge may be carried further, so
as to include cookery and similar menial arts. For some duties are
of the more necessary, others of the more honorable sort; as the
proverb says, 'slave before slave, master before master.' But all such
branches of knowledge are servile. There is likewise a science of
the master, which teaches the use of slaves; for the master as such is
concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet
this so-called science is not anything great or wonderful; for the
master need only know how to order that which the slave must know
how to execute. Hence those who are in a position which places them
above toil have stewards who attend to their households while they
occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics. But the art of
acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both from
the art of the master and the art of the slave, being a species of
hunting or war. Enough of the distinction between master and slave.

                                   VIII

  Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art of
getting wealth, in accordance with our usual method, for a slave has
been shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether the
art of getting wealth is the same with the art of managing a household
or a part of it, or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in
the way that the art of making shuttles is instrumental to the art
of weaving, or in the way that the casting of bronze is instrumental
to the art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the
same way, but the one provides tools and the other material; and by
material I mean the substratum out of which any work is made; thus
wool is the material of the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Now it
is easy to see that the art of household management is not identical
with the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material which
the other provides. For the art which uses household stores can be
no other than the art of household management. There is, however, a
doubt whether the art of getting wealth is a part of household
management or a distinct art. If the getter of wealth has to
consider whence wealth and property can be procured, but there are
many sorts of property and riches, then are husbandry, and the care
and provision of food in general, parts of the wealth-getting art or
distinct arts? Again, there are many sorts of food, and therefore
there are many kinds of lives both of animals and men; they must all
have food, and the differences in their food have made differences
in their ways of life. For of beasts, some are gregarious, others
are solitary; they live in the way which is best adapted to sustain
them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or herbivorous or
omnivorous: and their habits are determined for them by nature in such
a manner that they may obtain with greater facility the food of
their choice. But, as different species have different tastes, the
same things are not naturally pleasant to all of them; and therefore
the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous animals further differ among
themselves. In the lives of men too there is a great difference. The
laziest are shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get their
subsistence without trouble from tame animals; their flocks having
to wander from place to place in search of pasture, they are compelled
to follow them, cultivating a sort of living farm. Others support
themselves by hunting, which is of different kinds. Some, for example,
are brigands, others, who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers or a
sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and others live by the
pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater number obtain a living
from the cultivated fruits of the soil. Such are the modes of
subsistence which prevail among those whose industry springs up of
itself, and whose food is not acquired by exchange and retail trade-
there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman, the
hunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two employments,
eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus the life of
a shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the life of a
farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly
combined in any way which the needs of men may require. Property, in
the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to
all, both when they are first born, and when they are grown up. For
some animals bring forth, together with their offspring, so much
food as will last until they are able to supply themselves; of this
the vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance; and the
viviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply of food for
their young in themselves, which is called milk. In like manner we may
infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake,
and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use
and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them,
for food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments.
Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the
inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man.
And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of
acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which
we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men who,
though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war
of such a kind is naturally just.

  Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature
is a part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of
household management must either find ready to hand, or itself
provide, such things necessary to life, and useful for the community
of the family or state, as can be stored. They are the elements of
true riches; for the amount of property which is needed for a good
life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that

     No bound to riches has been fixed for man.

But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; for
the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number or
size, and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be
used in a household or in a state. And so we see that there is a
natural art of acquisition which is practiced by managers of
households and by statesmen, and what is the reason of this.

                                    IX

  There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly
and rightly called an art of wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested
the notion that riches and property have no limit. Being nearly
connected with the preceding, it is often identified with it. But
though they are not very different, neither are they the same. The
kind already described is given by nature, the other is gained by
experience and art.

  Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following
considerations:

  Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to
the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the
proper, and the other the improper or secondary use of it. For
example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are
uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to
him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not
its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an
object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for the art
of exchange extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what
is natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, others
too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a natural part
of the art of getting wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased to
exchange when they had enough. In the first community, indeed, which
is the family, this art is obviously of no use, but it begins to be
useful when the society increases. For the members of the family
originally had all things in common; later, when the family divided
into parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts in
different things, which they had to give in exchange for what they
wanted, a kind of barter which is still practiced among barbarous
nations who exchange with one another the necessaries of life and
nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, in exchange
for coin, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the
wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for
the satisfaction of men's natural wants. The other or more complex
form of exchange grew, as might have been inferred, out of the
simpler. When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent
on those of another, and they imported what they needed, and
exported what they had too much of, money necessarily came into use.
For the various necessaries of life are not easily carried about,
and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other
something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to
the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this
the value was at first measured simply by size and weight, but in
process of time they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of
weighing and to mark the value.

  When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter
of necessary articles arose the other art of wealth getting, namely,
retail trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, but
became more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence
and by what exchanges the greatest profit might be made. Originating
in the use of coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought
to be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces
riches and wealth; having to consider how they may be accumulated.
Indeed, riches is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin,
because the arts of getting wealth and retail trade are concerned with
coin. Others maintain that coined money is a mere sham, a thing not
natural, but conventional only, because, if the users substitute
another commodity for it, it is worthless, and because it is not
useful as a means to any of the necessities of life, and, indeed, he
who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary food. But how
can that be wealth of which a man may have a great abundance and yet
perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer
turned everything that was set before him into gold?

  Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of
getting wealth than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are
right. For natural riches and the natural art of wealth-getting are
a different thing; in their true form they are part of the
management of a household; whereas retail trade is the art of
producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange. And it is thought
to be concerned with coin; for coin is the unit of exchange and the
measure or limit of it. And there is no bound to the riches which
spring from this art of wealth getting. As in the art of medicine
there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts
there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim
at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the means there
is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art
of wealth-getting there is no limit of the end, which is riches of the
spurious kind, and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of
wealth-getting which consists in household management, on the other
hand, has a limit; the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not its
business. And, therefore, in one point of view, all riches must have a
limit; nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we find the opposite to be
the case; for all getters of wealth increase their hoard of coin
without limit. The source of the confusion is the near connection
between the two kinds of wealth-getting; in either, the instrument
is the same, although the use is different, and so they pass into
one another; for each is a use of the same property, but with a
difference: accumulation is the end in the one case, but there is a
further end in the other. Hence some persons are led to believe that
getting wealth is the object of household management, and the whole
idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their
money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this
disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not
upon living well; and, as their desires are unlimited they also desire
that the means of gratifying them should be without limit. Those who
do aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily pleasures;
and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property,
they are absorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises the second
species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in excess,
they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and, if
they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of getting
wealth, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty in a manner
contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not
intended to make wealth, but to inspire confidence; neither is this
the aim of the general's or of the physician's art; but the one aims
at victory and the other at health. Nevertheless, some men turn
every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they
conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all
things must contribute.

  Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth-getting which is
unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of
wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the other, and
to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned
with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind,
unlimited, but having a limit.

                                    X

  And we have found the answer to our original question, Whether the
art of getting wealth is the business of the manager of a household
and of the statesman or not their business? viz., that wealth is
presupposed by them. For as political science does not make men, but
takes them from nature and uses them, so too nature provides them with
earth or sea or the like as a source of food. At this stage begins the
duty of the manager of a household, who has to order the things
which nature supplies; he may be compared to the weaver who has not to
make but to use wool, and to know, too, what sort of wool is good
and serviceable or bad and unserviceable. Were this otherwise, it
would be difficult to see why the art of getting wealth is a part of
the management of a household and the art of medicine not; for
surely the members of a household must have health just as they must
have life or any other necessary. The answer is that as from one point
of view the master of the house and the ruler of the state have to
consider about health, from another point of view not they but the
physician; so in one way the art of household management, in another
way the subordinate art, has to consider about wealth. But, strictly
speaking, as I have already said, the means of life must be provided
beforehand by nature; for the business of nature is to furnish food to
that which is born, and the food of the offspring is always what
remains over of that from which it is produced. Wherefore the art of
getting wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural.

  There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part
of household management, the other is retail trade: the former
necessary and honorable, while that which consists in exchange is
justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain
from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason,
is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the
natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange,
but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means
the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money
because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of an modes of
getting wealth this is the most unnatural.

                                    XI

  Enough has been said about the theory of wealth-getting; we will now
proceed to the practical part. The discussion of such matters is not
unworthy of philosophy, but to be engaged in them practically is
illiberal and irksome. The useful parts of wealth-getting are,
first, the knowledge of livestock- which are most profitable, and
where, and how- as, for example, what sort of horses or sheep or
oxen or any other animals are most likely to give a return. A man
ought to know which of these pay better than others, and which pay
best in particular places, for some do better in one place and some in
another. Secondly, husbandry, which may be either tillage or planting,
and the keeping of bees and of fish, or fowl, or of any animals
which may be useful to man. These are the divisions of the true or
proper art of wealth-getting and come first. Of the other, which
consists in exchange, the first and most important division is
commerce (of which there are three kinds- the provision of a ship, the
conveyance of goods, exposure for sale- these again differing as
they are safer or more profitable), the second is usury, the third,
service for hire- of this, one kind is employed in the mechanical
arts, the other in unskilled and bodily labor. There is still a
third sort of wealth getting intermediate between this and the first
or natural mode which is partly natural, but is also concerned with
exchange, viz., the industries that make their profit from the
earth, and from things growing from the earth which, although they
bear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable; for example, the cutting
of timber and all mining. The art of mining, by which minerals are
obtained, itself has many branches, for there are various kinds of
things dug out of the earth. Of the several divisions of
wealth-getting I now speak generally; a minute consideration of them
might be useful in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell upon
them at greater length now.

  Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is the least
element of chance; they are the meanest in which the body is most
deteriorated, the most servile in which there is the greatest use of
the body, and the most illiberal in which there is the least need of
excellence.

  Works have been written upon these subjects by various persons;
for example, by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, who
have treated of Tillage and Planting, while others have treated of
other branches; any one who cares for such matters may refer to
their writings. It would be well also to collect the scattered stories
of the ways in which individuals have succeeded in amassing a fortune;
for all this is useful to persons who value the art of getting wealth.
There is the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device,
which involves a principle of universal application, but is attributed
to him on account of his reputation for wisdom. He was reproached
for his poverty, which was supposed to show that philosophy was of
no use. According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars
while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of
olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave deposits
for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he
hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the
harvest-time came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden,
he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of
money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich
if they like, but that their ambition is of another sort. He is
supposed to have given a striking proof of his wisdom, but, as I was
saying, his device for getting wealth is of universal application, and
is nothing but the creation of a monopoly. It is an art often
practiced by cities when they are want of money; they make a
monopoly of provisions.

  There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with him,
bought up an the iron from the iron mines; afterwards, when the
merchants from their various markets came to buy, he was the only
seller, and without much increasing the price he gained 200 per
cent. Which when Dionysius heard, he told him that he might take
away his money, but that he must not remain at Syracuse, for he
thought that the man had discovered a way of making money which was
injurious to his own interests. He made the same discovery as
Thales; they both contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. And
statesmen as well ought to know these things; for a state is often
as much in want of money and of such devices for obtaining it as a
household, or even more so; hence some public men devote themselves
entirely to finance.

                                   XII

  Of household management we have seen that there are three parts- one
is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already,
another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father,
we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs,
the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a
constitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order
of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female,
just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more
immature. But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and
are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies
that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at
all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor
to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of
respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his
foot-pan. The relation of the male to the female is of this kind,
but there the inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over his
children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the
respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore
Homer has appropriately called Zeus 'father of Gods and men,'
because he is the king of them all. For a king is the natural superior
of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them,
and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.

                                   XIII

  Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men
than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human excellence
more than to the excellence of property which we call wealth, and to
the virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A question
may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a
slave beyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerial
qualities- whether he can have the virtues of temperance, courage,
justice, and the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and
ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a
difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they
differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and share
in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that they have no
virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and children,
whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave
and just, and is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or
note So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural
subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if a
noble nature is equally required in both, why should one of them
always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this
is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler and
subject is a difference of kind, which the difference of more and less
never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and
that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is
intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well? If the subject, how
can he obey well? If he be licentious and cowardly, he will
certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore, that both of them
must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural subjects also vary
among themselves. Here the very constitution of the soul has shown
us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is
subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to be different
from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of the rational,
and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same
principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule
and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; the
freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which
the male rules over the female, or the man over the child; although
the parts of the soul are present in an of them, they are present in
different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all;
the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but
it is immature. So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the
moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in such
manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his
duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for
his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and
rational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, oil the other
hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each of
them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the
temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a
man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the
courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And
this holds of all other virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we
look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue
consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or
the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is
their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues.
All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the
poet says of women,

     Silence is a woman's glory,

but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect,
and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone,
but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the
virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined that
a slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will
obviously require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing
in his duty through cowardice or lack of self-control. Some one will
ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be
required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work
through the lack of self control? But is there not a great
difference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his master's
life; the artisan is less closely connected with him, and only attains
excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort of
mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave
exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is
manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such
excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of
mastership which trains the slave in his duties. Wherefore they are
mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we
should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of
admonition than children.

  So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse
with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue
the good and good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed
when we speak of the different forms of government. For, inasmuch as
every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the
parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to
the virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained by
education with an eye to the constitution, if the virtues of either of
them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the
state. And they must make a difference: for the children grow up to be
citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women.

  Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us
speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as
complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the
various theories of a perfect state.

                                 BOOK TWO

                                    I

  OUR PURPOSE is to consider what form of political community is
best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of
life. We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions,
both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any
theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and
useful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose that in seeking
for something beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistical display
at any cost; we only undertake this inquiry because all the
constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.

  We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. Three
alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must either
have (1) all things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things in
common and some not. That they should have nothing in common is
clearly impossible, for the constitution is a community, and must at
any rate have a common place- one city will be in one place, and the
citizens are those who share in that one city. But should a well
ordered state have all things, as far as may be, in common, or some
only and not others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and
children and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the
Republic of Plato. Which is better, our present condition, or the
proposed new order of society.

                                    II

  There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the
principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution
evidently is not established by his arguments. Further, as a means
to the end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally
is impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere
precisely stated. I am speaking of the premise from which the argument
of Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the unity of the state the
better.' Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a
degree of unity as to be no longer a state? since the nature of a
state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from
being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an
individual; for the family may be said to be more than the state,
and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain
this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the
destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so
many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not
constitute a state. It is not like a military alliance The
usefulness of the latter depends upon its quantity even where there is
no difference in quality (for mutual protection is the end aimed
at), just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less
(in like manner, a state differs from a nation, when the nation has
not its population organized in villages, but lives an Arcadian sort
of life); but the elements out of which a unity is to be formed differ
in kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation, as I have already
remarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among freemen
and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for they
cannot an rule together, but must change at the end of a year or
some other period of time or in some order of succession. The result
is that upon this plan they all govern; just as if shoemakers and
carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same persons
did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. And since it is
better that this should be so in politics as well, it is clear that
while there should be continuance of the same persons in power where
this is possible, yet where this is not possible by reason of the
natural equality of the citizens, and at the same time it is just that
an should share in the government (whether to govern be a good thing
or a bad), an approximation to this is that equals should in turn
retire from office and should, apart from official position, be
treated alike. Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in
turn, as if they were no longer the same persons. In like manner
when they hold office there is a variety in the offices held. Hence it
is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some
persons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good of
cities is in reality their destruction; but surely the good of
things must be that which preserves them. Again, in another point of
view, this extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a
family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than a
family, and a city only comes into being when the community is large
enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to be
desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the
greater.

                                   III

  But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have
the greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved to
follow from the fact 'of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the
same instant of time,' which, according to Socrates, is the sign of
perfect unity in a state. For the word 'all' is ambiguous. If the
meaning be that every individual says 'mine' and 'not mine' at the
same time, then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be in
some degree accomplished; each man will call the same person his own
son and the same person his wife, and so of his property and of all
that falls to his lot. This, however, is not the way in which people
would speak who had their had their wives and children in common; they
would say 'all' but not 'each.' In like manner their property would be
described as belonging to them, not severally but collectively.
There is an obvious fallacy in the term 'all': like some other
words, 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' it is ambiguous, and even in abstract
argument becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all persons call
the same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a fine
thing, but it is impracticable; or if the words are taken in the other
sense, such a unity in no way conduces to harmony. And there is
another objection to the proposal. For that which is common to the
greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one
thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and
only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides
other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty
which he expects another to fulfill; as in families many attendants
are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand
sons who will not be his sons individually but anybody will be equally
the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike.
Further, upon this principle, every one will use the word 'mine' of
one who is prospering or the reverse, however small a fraction he
may himself be of the whole number; the same boy will be 'so and
so's son,' the son of each of the thousand, or whatever be the
number of the citizens; and even about this he will not be positive;
for it is impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or
whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. But which is
better- for each to say 'mine' in this way, making a man the same
relation to two thousand or ten thousand citizens, or to use the
word 'mine' in the ordinary and more restricted sense? For usually the
same person is called by one man his own son whom another calls his
own brother or cousin or kinsman- blood relation or connection by
marriage either of himself or of some relation of his, and yet another
his clansman or tribesman; and how much better is it to be the real
cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato's fashion! Nor is
there any way of preventing brothers and children and fathers and
mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for children are
born like their parents, and they will necessarily be finding
indications of their relationship to one another. Geographers
declare such to be the fact; they say that in part of Upper Libya,
where the women are common, nevertheless the children who are born are
assigned to their respective fathers on the ground of their
likeness. And some women, like the females of other animals- for
example, mares and cows- have a strong tendency to produce offspring
resembling their parents, as was the case with the Pharsalian mare
called Honest.

                                    IV

  Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of such
a community to guard, will be assaults and homicides, voluntary as
well as involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all which are most
unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near
relations, but not equally unholy when there is no relationship.
Moreover, they are much more likely to occur if the relationship is
unknown, and, when they have occurred, the customary expiations of
them cannot be made. Again, how strange it is that Socrates, after
having made the children common, should hinder lovers from carnal
intercourse only, but should permit love and familiarities between
father and son or between brother and brother, than which nothing
can be more unseemly, since even without them love of this sort is
improper. How strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no other
reason than the violence of the pleasure, as though the relationship
of father and son or of brothers with one another made no difference.

  This community of wives and children seems better suited to the
husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they have wives and
children in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker
ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain obedient
and not rebel. In a word, the result of such a law would be just the
opposite of which good laws ought to have, and the intention of
Socrates in making these regulations about women and children would
defeat itself. For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of
states and the preservative of them against revolutions; neither is
there anything which Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of the
state which he and all the world declare to be created by
friendship. But the unity which he commends would be like that of
the lovers in the Symposium, who, as Aristophanes says, desire to grow
together in the excess of their affection, and from being two to
become one, in which case one or both would certainly perish.
Whereas in a state having women and children common, love will be
watery; and the father will certainly not say 'my son,' or the son 'my
father.' As a little sweet wine mingled with a great deal of water
is imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of community, the
idea of relationship which is based upon these names will be lost;
there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son,
or the son about the father, or brothers about one another. Of the two
qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection- that a thing
is your own and that it is your only one-neither can exist in such a
state as this.

  Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the
rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the
rank of guardians into a lower rank, will be very difficult to
arrange; the givers or transferrers cannot but know whom they are
giving and transferring, and to whom. And the previously mentioned
evils, such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more
often amongst those who are transferred to the lower classes, or who
have a place assigned to them among the guardians; for they will no
longer call the members of the class they have left brothers, and
children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be afraid
of committing any crimes by reason of consanguinity. Touching the
community of wives and children, let this be our conclusion.

                                    V

  Next let us consider what should be our arrangements about property:
should the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in
common or not? This question may be discussed separately from the
enactments about women and children. Even supposing that the women and
children belong to individuals, according to the custom which is at
present universal, may there not be an advantage in having and using
possessions in common? Three cases are possible: (1) the soil may be
appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the
common stock; and this is the practice of some nations. Or (2), the
soil may be common, and may be cultivated in common, but the produce
divided among individuals for their private use; this is a form of
common property which is said to exist among certain barbarians. Or
(3), the soil and the produce may be alike common.

  When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be different
and easier to deal with; but when they till the ground for
themselves the question of ownership will give a world of trouble.
If they do not share equally enjoyments and toils, those who labor
much and get little will necessarily complain of those who labor
little and receive or consume much. But indeed there is always a
difficulty in men living together and having all human relations in
common, but especially in their having common property. The
partnerships of fellow-travelers are an example to the point; for they
generally fall out over everyday matters and quarrel about any
trifle which turns up. So with servants: we are most able to take
offense at those with whom we most we most frequently come into
contact in daily life.

  These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the
community of property; the present arrangement, if improved as it
might be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and would have
the advantages of both systems. Property should be in a certain
sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, when everyone
has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and
they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to
his own business. And yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of
use, 'Friends,' as the proverb says, 'will have all things common.'
Even now there are traces of such a principle, showing that it is
not impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists already to a
certain extent and may be carried further. For, although every man has
his own property, some things he will place at the disposal of his
friends, while of others he shares the use with them. The
Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and horses, and
dogs, as if they were their own; and when they lack provisions on a
journey, they appropriate what they find in the fields throughout
the country. It is clearly better that property should be private, but
the use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to
create in men this benevolent disposition. Again, how immeasurably
greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own; for
surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given
in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this, however, is
not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess, like the
miser's love of money; for all, or almost all, men love money and
other such objects in a measure. And further, there is the greatest
pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or
companions, which can only be rendered when a man has private
property. These advantages are lost by excessive unification of the
state. The exhibition of two virtues, besides, is visibly
annihilated in such a state: first, temperance towards women (for it
is an honorable action to abstain from another's wife for
temperance' sake); secondly, liberality in the matter of property.
No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an
example of liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality
consists in the use which is made of property.

  Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence;
men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in
some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend,
especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in
states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries
of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the
possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a
very different cause- the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see
that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in
common, though there are not many of them when compared with the
vast numbers who have private property.

  Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the
citizens will be saved, but also the advantages which they will
lose. The life which they are to lead appears to be quite
impracticable. The error of Socrates must be attributed to the false
notion of unity from which he starts. Unity there should be, both of
the family and of the state, but in some respects only. For there is a
point at which a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no
longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it
will become an inferior state, like harmony passing into unison, or
rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot. The state, as I was
saying, is a plurality which should be united and made into a
community by education; and it is strange that the author of a
system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous,
should expect to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and
not by philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which prevail
at Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, whereby the legislator
has made property common. Let us remember that we should not disregard
the experience of ages; in the multitude of years these things, if
they were good, would certainly not have been unknown; for almost
everything has been found out, although sometimes they are not put
together; in other cases men do not use the knowledge which they have.
Great light would be thrown on this subject if we could see such a
form of government in the actual process of construction; for the
legislator could not form a state at all without distributing and
dividing its constituents into associations for common meals, and into
phratries and tribes. But all this legislation ends only in forbidding
agriculture to the guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedaemonians
try to enforce already.

  But, indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, what
in such a community will be the general form of the state. The
citizens who are not guardians are the majority, and about them
nothing has been determined: are the husbandmen, too, to have their
property in common? Or is each individual to have his own? And are the
wives and children to be individual or common. If, like the guardians,
they are to have all things in common, what do they differ from
them, or what will they gain by submitting to their government? Or,
upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed the governing
class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give their slaves
the same institutions as their own, but forbid them gymnastic
exercises and the possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the
inferior classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriage
and property, what will be the form of the community? Must it not
contain two states in one, each hostile to the other He makes the
guardians into a mere occupying garrison, while the husbandmen and
artisans and the rest are the real citizens. But if so the suits and
quarrels, and all the evils which Socrates affirms to exist in other
states, will exist equally among them. He says indeed that, having
so good an education, the citizens will not need many laws, for
example laws about the city or about the markets; but then he confines
his education to the guardians. Again, he makes the husbandmen
owners of the property upon condition of their paying a tribute. But
in that case they are likely to be much more unmanageable and
conceited than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general. And
whether community of wives and property be necessary for the lower
equally with the higher class or not, and the questions akin to
this, what will be the education, form of government, laws of the
lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined: neither is it easy to
discover this, nor is their character of small importance if the
common life of the guardians is to be maintained.

  Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and retains private
property, the men will see to the fields, but who will see to the
house? And who will do so if the agricultural class have both their
property and their wives in common? Once more: it is absurd to
argue, from the analogy of the animals, that men and women should
follow the same pursuits, for animals have not to manage a
household. The government, too, as constituted by Socrates, contains
elements of danger; for he makes the same persons always rule. And
if this is often a cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, how
much more among high-spirited warriors? But that the persons whom he
makes rulers must be the same is evident; for the gold which the God
mingles in the souls of men is not at one time given to one, at
another time to another, but always to the same: as he says, 'God
mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth; but
brass and iron in those who are meant to be artisans and
husbandmen.' Again, he deprives the guardians even of happiness, and
says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy. But
the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts
enjoy happiness. In this respect happiness is not like the even
principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in
neither of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not
happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people. The
Republic of which Socrates discourses has all these difficulties,
and others quite as great.

                                    VI

  The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later
work, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the
constitution which is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has
definitely settled in all a few questions only; such as the
community of women and children, the community of property, and the
constitution of the state. The population is divided into two classes-
one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors; from this latter is
taken a third class of counselors and rulers of the state. But
Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artisans are to
have a share in the government, and whether they, too, are to carry
arms and share in military service, or not. He certainly thinks that
the women ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to
fight by their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with
digressions foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about
the education of the guardians. In the Laws there is hardly anything
but laws; not much is said about the constitution. This, which he
had intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings
round to the other or ideal form. For with the exception of the
community of women and property, he supposes everything to be the same
in both states; there is to be the same education; the citizens of
both are to live free from servile occupations, and there are to be
common meals in both. The only difference is that in the Laws, the
common meals are extended to women, and the warriors number 5000,
but in the Republic only 1000.

  The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always
exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in
everything can hardly be expected. We must not overlook the fact
that the number of 5000 citizens, just now mentioned, will require a
territory as large as Babylon, or some other huge site, if so many
persons are to be supported in idleness, together with their women and
attendants, who will be a multitude many times as great. In framing an
ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities.

  It is said that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two
points- the people and the country. But neighboring countries also
must not be forgotten by him, firstly because the state for which he
legislates is to have a political and not an isolated life. For a
state must have such a military force as will be serviceable against
her neighbors, and not merely useful at home. Even if the life of
action is not admitted to be the best, either for individuals or
states, still a city should be formidable to enemies, whether invading
or retreating.

  There is another point: Should not the amount of property be defined
in some way which differs from this by being clearer? For Socrates
says that a man should have so much property as will enable him to
live temperately, which is only a way of saying 'to live well'; this
is too general a conception. Further, a man may live temperately and
yet miserably. A better definition would be that a man must have so
much property as will enable him to live not only temperately but
liberally; if the two are parted, liberally will combine with
luxury; temperance will be associated with toil. For liberality and
temperance are the only eligible qualities which have to do with the
use of property. A man cannot use property with mildness or courage,
but temperately and liberally he may; and therefore the practice of
these virtues is inseparable from property. There is an inconsistency,
too, in too, in equalizing the property and not regulating the
number of the citizens; the population is to remain unlimited, and
he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number
of marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others,
because he finds this to be the case in existing states. But greater
care will be required than now; for among ourselves, whatever may be
the number of citizens, the property is always distributed among them,
and therefore no one is in want; but, if the property were incapable
of division as in the Laws, the supernumeraries, whether few or
many, would get nothing. One would have thought that it was even
more necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit
should be fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the
children, and of sterility in married persons. The neglect of this
subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing
cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent of
revolution and crime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of the
most ardent legislators, thought that the families and the number of
citizens ought to remain the same, although originally all the lots
may have been of different sizes: but in the Laws the opposite
principle is maintained. What in our opinion is the right
arrangement will have to be explained hereafter.

  There is another omission in the Laws: Socrates does not tell us how
the rulers differ from their subjects; he only says that they should
be related as the warp and the woof, which are made out of different
wools. He allows that a man's whole property may be increased
fivefold, but why should not his land also increase to a certain
extent? Again, will the good management of a household be promoted
by his arrangement of homesteads? For he assigns to each individual
two homesteads in separate places, and it is difficult to live in
two houses.

  The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor
oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usually
called a polity, and is composed of the heavy-armed soldiers. Now,
if he intended to frame a constitution which would suit the greatest
number of states, he was very likely right, but not if he meant to say
that this constitutional form came nearest to his first or ideal
state; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some
other more aristocratic government. Some, indeed, say that the best
constitution is a combination of all existing forms, and they praise
the Lacedaemonian because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and
democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of elders
the oligarchy while the democratic element is represented by the
Ephors; for the Ephors are selected from the people. Others,
however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element
of democracy in the common meals and in the habits of daily life. In
the Laws it is maintained that the best constitution is made up of
democracy and tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or
are the worst of all. But they are nearer the truth who combine many
forms; for the constitution is better which is made up of more
numerous elements. The constitution proposed in the Laws has no
element of monarchy at all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy,
leaning rather to oligarchy. This is seen in the mode of appointing
magistrates; for although the appointment of them by lot from among
those who have been already selected combines both elements, the way
in which the rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly and vote
for magistrates or discharge other political duties, while the rest
may do as they like, and the endeavor to have the greater number of
the magistrates appointed out of the richer classes and the highest
officers selected from those who have the greatest incomes, both these
are oligarchical features. The oligarchical principle prevails also in
the choice of the council, for all are compelled to choose, but the
compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class, and of
an equal number out of the second class and out of the third class,
but not in this latter case to all the voters but to those of the
first three classes; and the selection of candidates out of the fourth
class is only compulsory on the first and second. Then, from the
persons so chosen, he says that there ought to be an equal number of
each class selected. Thus a preponderance will be given to the
better sort of people, who have the larger incomes, because many of
the lower classes, not being compelled will not vote. These
considerations, and others which will be adduced when the time comes
for examining similar polities, tend to show that states like
Plato's should not be composed of democracy and monarchy. There is
also a danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who are
themselves elected; for, if but a small number choose to combine,
the elections will always go as they desire. Such is the
constitution which is described in the Laws.

                                   VII

  Other constitutions have been proposed; some by private persons,
others by philosophers and statesmen, which all come nearer to
established or existing ones than either of Plato's. No one else has
introduced such novelties as the community of women and children, or
public tables for women: other legislators begin with what is
necessary. In the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the
chief point of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions
turn. This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was
the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal
possessions. He thought that in a new colony the equalization might be
accomplished without difficulty, not so easily when a state was
already established; and that then the shortest way of compassing
the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to receive
marriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receive them.

  Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent,
accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already
observed, any citizen to possess more than five times the minimum
qualification But those who make such laws should remember what they
are apt to forget- that the legislator who fixes the amount of
property should also fix the number of children; for, if the
children are too many for the property, the law must be broken. And,
besides the violation of the law, it is a bad thing that many from
being rich should become poor; for men of ruined fortunes are sure
to stir up revolutions. That the equalization of property exercises an
influence on political society was clearly understood even by some
of the old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and others prohibiting
an individual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and there
are other laws in states which forbid the sale of property: among
the Locrians, for example, there is a law that a man is not to sell
his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some misfortune has
befallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the
preservation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the island of
Leucas, and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic,
for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification. Again,
where there is equality of property, the amount may be either too
large or too small, and the possessor may be living either in luxury
or penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only to aim at
the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount.
Further, if he prescribe this moderate amount equally to all, he
will be no nearer the mark; for it is not the possessions but the
desires of mankind which require to be equalized, and this is
impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws. But
Phaleas will probably reply that this is precisely what he means;
and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in states, not only
equal property, but equal education. Still he should tell precisely
what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in be in
having one and the same for all, if it is of a sort that predisposes
men to avarice, or ambition, or both. Moreover, civil troubles
arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but out of the
inequality of honor, though in opposite ways. For the common people
quarrel about the inequality of property, the higher class about the
equality of honor; as the poet says,

     The bad and good alike in honor share.

  There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for these
Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property,
which will take away from a man the temptation to be a highwayman,
because he is hungry or cold. But want is not the sole incentive to
crime; men also wish to enjoy themselves and not to be in a state of
desire- they wish to cure some desire, going beyond the necessities of
life, which preys upon them; nay, this is not the only reason- they
may desire superfluities in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied
with pain, and therefore they commit crimes.

  Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first,
moderate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits of
temperance; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on
themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere
but in philosophy; for all other pleasures we are dependent on others.
The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by
necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer
cold; and hence great is the honor bestowed, not on him who kills a
thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the
institutions of Phaleas avail only against petty crimes.

  There is another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to
promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator should
consider also its relation to neighboring nations, and to all who
are outside of it. The government must be organized with a view to
military strength; and of this he has said not a word. And so with
respect to property: there should not only be enough to supply the
internal wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from
without. The property of the state should not be so large that more
powerful neighbors may be tempted by it, while the owners are unable
to repel the invaders; nor yet so small that the state is unable to
maintain a war even against states of equal power, and of the same
character. Phaleas has not laid down any rule; but we should bear in
mind that abundance of wealth is an advantage. The best limit will
probably be, that a more powerful neighbor must have no inducement
to go to war with you by reason of the excess of your wealth, but only
such as he would have had if you had possessed less. There is a
story that Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to besiege
Atarneus, told him to consider how long the operation would take,
and then reckon up the cost which would be incurred in the time.
'For,' said he, 'I am willing for a smaller sum than that to leave
Atarneus at once.' These words of Eubulus made an impression on
Autophradates, and he desisted from the siege.

  The equalization of property is one of the things that tend to
prevent the citizens from quarrelling. Not that the gain in this
direction is very great. For the nobles will be dissatisfied because
they think themselves worthy of more than an equal share of honors;
and this is often found to be a cause of sedition and revolution.
And the avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time two obols was
pay enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men always
want more and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire
not to be satisfied, and most men live only for the gratification of
it. The beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as
to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent
the lower from getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down,
but not ill-treated. Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas
is imperfect; for he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be rich
also in slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abundance of what
are called his movables. Now either all these things must be
equalized, or some limit must be imposed on them, or they must an be
let alone. It would appear that Phaleas is legislating for a small
city only, if, as he supposes, all the artisans are to be public
slaves and not to form a supplementary part of the body of citizens.
But if there is a law that artisans are to be public slaves, it should
only apply to those engaged on public works, as at Epidamnus, or at
Athens on the plan which Diophantus once introduced.

  From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas was
wrong or right in his ideas.

                                   VIII

  Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, the same who
invented the art of planning cities, and who also laid out the
Piraeus- a strange man, whose fondness for distinction led him into
a general eccentricity of life, which made some think him affected
(for he would wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments; but these
were worn on a cheap but warm garment both in winter and summer);
he, besides aspiring to be an adept in the knowledge of nature, was
the first person not a statesman who made inquiries about the best
form of government.

  The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens divided
into three parts- one of artisans, one of husbandmen, and a third of
armed defenders of the state. He also divided the land into three
parts, one sacred, one public, the third private: the first was set
apart to maintain the customary worship of the Gods, the second was to
support the warriors, the third was the property of the husbandmen. He
also divided laws into three classes, and no more, for he maintained
that there are three subjects of lawsuits- insult, injury, and
homicide. He likewise instituted a single final court of appeal, to
which all causes seeming to have been improperly decided might be
referred; this court he formed of elders chosen for the purpose. He
was further of opinion that the decisions of the courts ought not to
be given by the use of a voting pebble, but that every one should have
a tablet on which he might not only write a simple condemnation, or
leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal; but, if he partly
acquitted and partly condemned, he was to distinguish accordingly.
To the existing law he objected that it obliged the judges to be
guilty of perjury, whichever way they voted. He also enacted that
those who discovered anything for the good of the state should be
honored; and he provided that the children of citizens who died in
battle should be maintained at the public expense, as if such an
enactment had never been heard of before, yet it actually exists at
Athens and in other places. As to the magistrates, he would have
them all elected by the people, that is, by the three classes
already mentioned, and those who were elected were to watch over the
interests of the public, of strangers, and of orphans. These are the
most striking points in the constitution of Hippodamus. There is not
much else.

  The first of these proposals to which objection may be taken is
the threefold division of the citizens. The artisans, and the
husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a share in the government.
But the husbandmen have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor
land, and therefore they become all but slaves of the warrior class.
That they should share in all the offices is an impossibility; for
generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the principal
magistrates, must be taken from the class of those who carry arms.
Yet, if the two other classes have no share in the government, how can
they be loyal citizens? It may be said that those who have arms must
necessarily be masters of both the other classes, but this is not so
easily accomplished unless they are numerous; and if they are, why
should the other classes share in the government at all, or have power
to appoint magistrates? Further, what use are farmers to the city?
Artisans there must be, for these are wanted in every city, and they
can live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen too, if they
really provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share in
the government. But in the republic of Hippodamus they are supposed to
have land of their own, which they cultivate for their private
benefit. Again, as to this common land out of which the soldiers are
maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the
warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen, although the
legislator intended to make a distinction between them. If, again,
there are to be other cultivators distinct both from the husbandmen,
who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will make a
fourth class, which has no place in the state and no share in
anything. Or, if the same persons are to cultivate their own lands,
and those of the public as well, they will have difficulty in
supplying the quantity of produce which will maintain two
households: and why, in this case, should there be any division, for
they might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the same
land and the same lots? There is surely a great confusion in all this.

  Neither is the law to commended which says that the judges, when a
simple issue is laid before them, should distinguish in their
judgement; for the judge is thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in
an arbitration, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with
one another about the decision, and therefore they can distinguish;
but in courts of law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators
take pains to prevent the judges from holding any communication with
one another. Again, will there not be confusion if the judge thinks
that damages should be given, but not so much as the suitor demands?
He asks, say, for twenty minae, and the judge allows him ten minae (or
in general the suitor asks for more and the judge allows less),
while another judge allows five, another four minae. In this way
they will go on splitting up the damages, and some will grant the
whole and others nothing: how is the final reckoning to be taken?
Again, no one contends that he who votes for a simple acquittal or
condemnation perjures himself, if the indictment has been laid in an
unqualified form; and this is just, for the judge who acquits does not
decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the
twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks that the
defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and yet condemns him.

  To honor those who discover anything which is useful to the state is
a proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot safely be enacted by
law, for it may encourage informers, and perhaps even lead to
political commotions. This question involves another. It has been
doubted whether it is or is not expedient to make any changes in the
laws of a country, even if another law be better. Now, if an changes
are inexpedient, we can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus;
for, under pretense of doing a public service, a man may introduce
measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the
constitution. But, since we have touched upon this subject, perhaps we
had better go a little into detail, for, as I was saying, there is a
difference of opinion, and it may sometimes seem desirable to make
changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences have certainly
been beneficial; medicine, for example, and gymnastic, and every other
art and craft have departed from traditional usage. And, if politics
be an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art.
That improvement has occurred is shown by the fact that old customs
are exceedingly simple and barbarous. For the ancient Hellenes went
about armed and bought their brides of each other. The remains of
ancient laws which have come down to us are quite absurd; for example,
at Cumae there is a law about murder, to the effect that if the
accuser produce a certain number of witnesses from among his own
kinsmen, the accused shall be held guilty. Again, men in general
desire the good, and not merely what their fathers had. But the
primeval inhabitants, whether they were born of the earth or were
the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed to have been no
better than ordinary or even foolish people among ourselves (such is
certainly the tradition concerning the earth-born men); and it would
be ridiculous to rest contented with their notions. Even when laws
have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered.
As in other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible that all things
should be precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be
universal, but actions are concerned with particulars. Hence we
infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed; but
when we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution
would seem to be required. For the habit of lightly changing the
laws is an evil, and, when the advantage is small, some errors both of
lawgivers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not gain
so much by making the change as he will lose by the habit of
disobedience. The analogy of the arts is false; a change in a law is a
very different thing from a change in an art. For the law has no power
to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given
by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws
enfeebles the power of the law. Even if we admit that the laws are
to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in every state? And are
they to be changed by anybody who likes, or only by certain persons?
These are very important questions; and therefore we had better
reserve the discussion of them to a more suitable occasion.

                                    IX

  In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in all
governments, two points have to be considered: first, whether any
particular law is good or bad, when compared with the perfect state;
secondly, whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and
character which the lawgiver has set before his citizens. That in a
well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and not have to
provide for their daily wants is generally acknowledged, but there
is a difficulty in seeing how this leisure is to be attained. The
Thessalian Penestae have often risen against their masters, and the
Helots in like manner against the Lacedaemonians, for whose
misfortunes they are always lying in wait. Nothing, however, of this
kind has as yet happened to the Cretans; the reason probably is that
the neighboring cities, even when at war with one another, never
form an alliance with rebellious serfs, rebellions not being for their
interest, since they themselves have a dependent population. Whereas
all the neighbors of the Lacedaemonians, whether Argives,
Messenians, or Arcadians, were their enemies. In Thessaly, again,
the original revolt of the slaves occurred because the Thessalians
were still at war with the neighboring Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and
Magnesians. Besides, if there were no other difficulty, the
treatment or management of slaves is a troublesome affair; for, if not
kept in hand, they are insolent, and think that they are as good as
their masters, and, if harshly treated, they hate and conspire against
them. Now it is clear that when these are the results the citizens
of a state have not found out the secret of managing their subject
population.

  Again, the license of the Lacedaemonian women defeats the
intention of the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the happiness
of the state. For, a husband and wife being each a part of every
family, the state may be considered as about equally divided into
men and women; and, therefore, in those states in which the
condition of the women is bad, half the city may be regarded as having
no laws. And this is what has actually happened at Sparta; the
legislator wanted to make the whole state hardy and temperate, and
he has carried out his intention in the case of the men, but he has
neglected the women, who live in every sort of intemperance and
luxury. The consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly
valued, especially if the citizen fall under the dominion of their
wives, after the manner of most warlike races, except the Celts and
a few others who openly approve of male loves. The old mythologer
would seem to have been right in uniting Ares and Aphrodite, for all
warlike races are prone to the love either of men or of women. This
was exemplified among the Spartans in the days of their greatness;
many things were managed by their women. But what difference does it
make whether women rule, or the rulers are ruled by women? The
result is the same. Even in regard to courage, which is of no use in
daily life, and is needed only in war, the influence of the
Lacedaemonian women has been most mischievous. The evil showed
itself in the Theban invasion, when, unlike the women other cities,
they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy.
This license of the Lacedaemonian women existed from the earliest
times, and was only what might be expected. For, during the wars of
the Lacedaemonians, first against the Argives, and afterwards
against the Arcadians and Messenians, the men were long away from
home, and, on the return of peace, they gave themselves into the
legislator's hand, already prepared by the discipline of a soldier's
life (in which there are many elements of virtue), to receive his
enactments. But, when Lycurgus, as tradition says, wanted to bring the
women under his laws, they resisted, and he gave up the attempt. These
then are the causes of what then happened, and this defect in the
constitution is clearly to be attributed to them. We are not, however,
considering what is or is not to be excused, but what is right or
wrong, and the disorder of the women, as I have already said, not only
gives an air of indecorum to the constitution considered in itself,
but tends in a measure to foster avarice.

  The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the
inequality of property. While some of the Spartan citizen have quite
small properties, others have very large ones; hence the land has
passed into the hands of a few. And this is due also to faulty laws;
for, although the legislator rightly holds up to shame the sale or
purchase of an inheritance, he allows anybody who likes to give or
bequeath it. Yet both practices lead to the same result. And nearly
two-fifths of the whole country are held by women; this is owing to
the number of heiresses and to the large dowries which are
customary. It would surely have been better to have given no dowries
at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones. As the law now stands,
a man may bestow his heiress on any one whom he pleases, and, if he
die intestate, the privilege of giving her away descends to his
heir. Hence, although the country is able to maintain 1500 cavalry and
30,000 hoplites, the whole number of Spartan citizens fell below 1000.
The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property;
for the city sank under a single defeat; the want of men was their
ruin. There is a tradition that, in the days of their ancient kings,
they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to
strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of
population was experienced by them; indeed, at one time Sparta is said
to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens Whether this
statement is true or not, it would certainly have been better to
have maintained their numbers by the equalization of property.
Again, the law which relates to the procreation of children is adverse
to the correction of this inequality. For the legislator, wanting to
have as many Spartans as he could, encouraged the citizens to have
large families; and there is a law at Sparta that the father of
three sons shall be exempt from military service, and he who has
four from all the burdens of the state. Yet it is obvious that, if
there were many children, the land being distributed as it is, many of
them must necessarily fall into poverty.

  The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point; I mean
the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest matters,
but the Ephors are chosen from the whole people, and so the office
is apt to fall into the hands of very poor men, who, being badly
off, are open to bribes. There have been many examples at Sparta of
this evil in former times; and quite recently, in the matter of the
Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin
the state. And so great and tyrannical is their power, that even the
kings have been compelled to court them, so that, in this way as
well together with the royal office, the whole constitution has
deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has turned into a
democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for
the people are contented when they have a share in the highest office,
and the result, whether due to the legislator or to chance, has been
advantageous. For if a constitution is to be permanent, all the
parts of the state must wish that it should exist and the same
arrangements be maintained. This is the case at Sparta, where the
kings desire its permanence because they have due honor in their own
persons; the nobles because they are represented in the council of
elders (for the office of elder is a reward of virtue); and the
people, because all are eligible to the Ephoralty. The election of
Ephors out of the whole people is perfectly right, but ought not to be
carried on in the present fashion, which is too childish. Again,
they have the decision of great causes, although they are quite
ordinary men, and therefore they should not determine them merely on
their own judgment, but according to written rules, and to the laws.
Their way of life, too, is not in accordance with the spirit of the
constitution- they have a deal too much license; whereas, in the
case of the other citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable
that they run away from the law into the secret indulgence of
sensual pleasures.

  Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It may be
said that the elders are good men and well trained in manly virtue;
and that, therefore, there is an advantage to the state in having
them. But that judges of important causes should hold office for
life is a disputable thing, for the mind grows old as well as the
body. And when men have been educated in such a manner that even the
legislator himself cannot trust them, there is real danger. Many of
the elders are well known to have taken bribes and to have been guilty
of partiality in public affairs. And therefore they ought not to be
irresponsible; yet at Sparta they are so. But (it may be replied),
'All magistracies are accountable to the Ephors.' Yes, but this
prerogative is too great for them, and we maintain that the control
should be exercised in some other manner. Further, the mode in which
the Spartans elect their elders is childish; and it is improper that
the person to be elected should canvass for the office; the
worthiest should be appointed, whether he chooses or not. And here the
legislator clearly indicates the same intention which appears in other
parts of his constitution; he would have his citizens ambitious, and
he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the elders; for
no one would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and
avarice, almost more than any other passions, are the motives of
crime.

  Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, I will consider
at another time; they should at any rate be chosen, not as they are
now, but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The
legislator himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them
really good men; at least he shows a great distrust of their virtue.
For this reason the Spartans used to join enemies with them in the
same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be
conservative of the state.

  Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called
'phiditia,' regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have been
provided at the public cost, as in Crete; but among the Lacedaemonians
every one is expected to contribute, and some of them are too poor
to afford the expense; thus the intention of the legislator is
frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a popular institution,
but the existing manner of regulating them is the reverse of
popular. For the very poor can scarcely take part in them; and,
according to ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not
allowed to retain their rights of citizenship.

  The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and with
justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are perpetual
generals, and this office of admiral is but the setting up of
another king.

  The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws, against the intention of
the legislator, is likewise justified; the whole constitution has
regard to one part of virtue only- the virtue of the soldier, which
gives victory in war. So long as they were at war, therefore, their
power was preserved, but when they had attained empire they fell for
of the arts of peace they knew nothing, and had never engaged in any
employment higher than war. There is another error, equally great,
into which they have fallen. Although they truly think that the
goods for which men contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than
by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to
the virtue which gains them.

  Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed; there is no
money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great
wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the
land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into
one another's contributions. The result which the legislator has
produced is the reverse of beneficial; for he has made his city
poor, and his citizens greedy.

  Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are the
principal defects.

                                    X

  The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan, and in some
few points is quite as good; but for the most part less perfect in
form. The older constitutions are generally less elaborate than the
later, and the Lacedaemonian is said to be, and probably is, in a very
great measure, a copy of the Cretan. According to tradition, Lycurgus,
when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charillus, went abroad and
spent most of his time in Crete. For the two countries are nearly
connected; the Lyctians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and the
colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which
they found existing among the inhabitants. Even to this day the
Perioeci, or subject population of Crete, are governed by the original
laws which Minos is supposed to have enacted. The island seems to be
intended by nature for dominion in Hellas, and to be well situated; it
extends right across the sea, around which nearly all the Hellenes are
settled; and while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the
other almost reaches to the region of Asia about Triopium and
Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the empire of the sea, subduing some of
the islands and colonizing others; at last he invaded Sicily, where he
died near Camicus.

  The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots are
the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the other, and both Cretans
and Lacedaemonians have common meals, which were anciently called by
the Lacedaemonians not 'phiditia' but 'andria'; and the Cretans have
the same word, the use of which proves that the common meals
originally came from Crete. Further, the two constitutions are
similar; for the office of the Ephors is the same as that of the
Cretan Cosmi, the only difference being that whereas the Ephors are
five, the Cosmi are ten in number. The elders, too, answer to the
elders in Crete, who are termed by the Cretans the council. And the
kingly office once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and the
Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war. All classes share in
the ecclesia, but it can only ratify the decrees of the elders and the
Cosmi.

  The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the
Lacedaemonian; for in Lacedaemon every one pays so much per head,
or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, forbids him
to exercise the rights of citizenship. But in Crete they are of a more
popular character. There, of all the fruits of the earth and cattle
raised on the public lands, and of the tribute which is paid by the
Perioeci, one portion is assigned to the Gods and to the service of
the state, and another to the common meals, so that men, women, and
children are all supported out of a common stock. The legislator has
many ingenious ways of securing moderation in eating, which he
conceives to be a gain; he likewise encourages the separation of men
from women, lest they should have too many children, and the
companionship of men with one another- whether this is a good or bad
thing I shall have an opportunity of considering at another time.
But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered than the
Lacedaemonian there can be no doubt.

  On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the
Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the good. Like the
Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in Crete this is not
counterbalanced by a corresponding political advantage. At Sparta
every one is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in
the highest office, want the constitution to be permanent. But in
Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain families, and not out of
the whole people, and the elders out of those who have been Cosmi.

  The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which has been
already made about the Lacedaemonian elders. Their irresponsibility
and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their arbitrary power of
acting upon their own judgment, and dispensing with written law, is
dangerous. It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that
the people are not discontented at being excluded from it. For there
is no profit to be made out of the office as out of the Ephoralty,
since, unlike the Ephors, the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed
from temptation.

  The remedy by which they correct the evil of this institution is
an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy than to a
constitutional state. For the Cosmi are often expelled by a conspiracy
of their own colleagues, or of private individuals; and they are
allowed also to resign before their term of office has expired. Surely
all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the
will of man, which is a very unsafe rule. Worst of all is the
suspension of the office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles
often have recourse when they will not submit to justice. This shows
that the Cretan government, although possessing some of the
characteristics of a constitutional state, is really a close
oligarchy.

  The nobles have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they get
together a party among the common people and their own friends and
then quarrel and fight with one another. What is this but the
temporary destruction of the state and dissolution of society? A
city is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also
able to attack her. But, as I have already said, the island of Crete
is saved by her situation; distance has the same effect as the
Lacedaemonian prohibition of strangers; and the Cretans have no
foreign dominions. This is the reason why the Perioeci are contented
in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. But when
lately foreign invaders found their way into the island, the
weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough of the
government of Crete.

                                    XI

  The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form of
government, which differs from that of any other state in several
respects, though it is in some very like the Lacedaemonian. Indeed,
all three states- the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian-
nearly resemble one another, and are very different from any others.
Many of the Carthaginian institutions are excellent The superiority of
their constitution is proved by the fact that the common people remain
loyal to the constitution the Carthaginians have never had any
rebellion worth speaking of, and have never been under the rule of a
tyrant.

  Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles
the Lacedaemonian are the following: The common tables of the clubs
answer to the Spartan phiditia, and their magistracy of the 104 to the
Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the
magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit-
this is an improvement. They have also their kings and their
gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to the kings and
elders of Sparta. Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of
the same family, nor that an ordinary one, but if there is some
distinguished family they are selected out of it and not appointed
by senority- this is far better. Such officers have great power, and
therefore, if they are persons of little worth, do a great deal of
harm, and they have already done harm at Lacedaemon.

  Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for
which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally
to all the forms of government which we have mentioned. But of the
deflections from aristocracy and constitutional government, some
incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders,
if unanimous, may determine whether they will or will not bring a
matter before the people, but when they are not unanimous, the
people decide on such matters as well. And whatever the kings and
elders bring before the people is not only heard but also determined
by them, and any one who likes may oppose it; now this is not
permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistrates of five who have
under them many important matters should be co-opted, that they should
choose the supreme council of 100, and should hold office longer
than other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before
and after they hold office)- these are oligarchical features; their
being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points,
such as the practice of having all suits tried by the magistrates, and
not some by one class of judges or jurors and some by another, as at
Lacedaemon, are characteristic of aristocracy. The Carthaginian
constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy,
chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men
in general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for
their merit, but for their wealth: a man, they say, who is poor cannot
rule well- he has not the leisure. If, then, election of magistrates
for their wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for
merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the
constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the Carthaginians choose
their magistrates, and particularly the highest of them- their kings
and generals- with an eye both to merit and to wealth.

  But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from aristocracy,
the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is more absolutely
necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in
office, but when out of office, should have leisure and not disgrace
themselves in any way; and to this his attention should be first
directed. Even if you must have regard to wealth, in order to secure
leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices,
such as those of kings and generals, should be bought. The law which
allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than virtue, and the
whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever the chiefs of the
state deem anything honorable, the other citizens are sure to follow
their example; and, where virtue has not the first place, their
aristocracy cannot be firmly established. Those who have been at the
expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying
themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest man
will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has
incurred a great expense will not. Wherefore they should rule who
are able to rule best. And even if the legislator does not care to
protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure
for them when in office.

  It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person should
hold many offices, which is a favorite practice among the
Carthaginians, for one business is better done by one man. The
legislator should see to this and should not appoint the same person
to be a flute-player and a shoemaker. Hence, where the state is large,
it is more in accordance both with constitutional and with democratic
principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many
persons. For, as I said, this arrangement is fairer to all, and any
action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner performed.
We have a proof in military and naval matters; the duties of command
and of obedience in both these services extend to all.

  The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they
successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of
the people after another by sending them to their colonies. This is
their panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state.
Accident favors them, but the legislator should be able to provide
against revolution without trusting to accidents. As things are, if
any misfortune occurred, and the bulk of the subjects revolted,
there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods.

  Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian
constitutions, which are justly celebrated.

                                   XII

  Of those who have treated of governments, some have never taken
any part at all in public affairs, but have passed their lives in a
private station; about most of them, what was worth telling has been
already told. Others have been lawgivers, either in their own or in
foreign cities, whose affairs they have administered; and of these
some have only made laws, others have framed constitutions; for
example, Lycurgus and Solon did both. Of the Lacedaemonian
constitution I have already spoken. As to Solon, he is thought by some
to have been a good legislator, who put an end to the exclusiveness of
the oligarchy, emancipated the people, established the ancient
Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different elements of the
state. According to their view, the council of Areopagus was an
oligarchical element, the elected magistracy, aristocratical, and
the courts of law, democratical. The truth seems to be that the
council and the elected magistracy existed before the time of Solon,
and were retained by him, but that he formed the courts of law out
of an the citizens, thus creating the democracy, which is the very
reason why he is sometimes blamed. For in giving the supreme power
to the law courts, which are elected by lot, he is thought to have
destroyed the non-democratic element. When the law courts grew
powerful, to please the people who were now playing the tyrant the old
constitution was changed into the existing democracy. Ephialtes and
Pericles curtailed the power of the Areopagus; Pericles also
instituted the payment of the juries, and thus every demagogue in turn
increased the power of the democracy until it became what we now
see. All this is true; it seems, however, to be the result of
circumstances, and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people,
having been instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the
Persian War, began to get a notion of itself, and followed worthless
demagogues, whom the better class opposed. Solon, himself, appears
to have given the Athenians only that power of electing to offices and
calling to account the magistrates which was absolutely necessary; for
without it they would have been in a state of slavery and enmity to
the government. All the magistrates he appointed from the notables and
the men of wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni, or
from the class called zeugitae, or from a third class of so-called
knights or cavalry. The fourth class were laborers who had no share in
any magistracy.

  Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epizephyrian
Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his own city of Catana,
and for the other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily. Some people
attempt to make out that Onomacritus was the first person who had
any special skill in legislation, and that he, although a Locrian by
birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived in the exercise of his
prophetic art; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and
Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But
their account is quite inconsistent with chronology.

  There was also Philolaus, the Corinthian, who gave laws to the
Thebans. This Philolaus was one of the family of the Bacchiadae,